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T he Paradox in Fear and Trem bling
by JEREMY WALKER
Fear and Trembling is one of Kierkegaard's most important works, but at the 
same time one of the most difficult. It is important, because it contributes with 
forceful brevity to the ancient philosophical problem of the relations between 
reason and faith. Its difficulty lies in understanding the exact nature of its 
contribution towards solving this problem. In this paper, however, I shall not 
be discussing such profound matters. Rather, I shall try to offer an analysis of 
Fear and Trembling from one particular point of view. I want to exhibit the 
logical structure of a certain set of interrelated concepts which play a central 
role in its argument. And even in this my primary aim is merely to make clear 
certain crucial distinctions in this conceptual schema; distinctions which are not 
always seen clearly, but whose blurring makes it impossible to understand the 
teaching of Fear and Trembling. Among these concepts are the paradox and 
the absurd; the miracle, the marvellous, the prodigy, the preposterous, the im­
possible, the contradiction, the conflict, and the unreasonable; understanding, 
thinking, believing; and the central concept of faith. Hence my paper might 
well be thought of as a ‘Prolegomenon to the understanding of Fear and 
Trembling’. There are two further restrictions that I have imposed upon myself 
here. First, I have not thought it proper to extend my analysis to the occurren­
ces of these, and related, concepts in others of Kierkegaard's pseudonymous 
works, for example, Philosophical Fragments and Concluding Unscientific 
Postscript. The reason for this restriction is that the pseudonym attached to 
Fear and Trembling (‘Johannes de silentio') is unique, and that therefore the 
point of view expressed in this book is also unique and not to be assimilated 
to those expressed in the Johannes Climacus works mentioned above. Second, 
I have not considered the views expressed on these matters by Kierkegaard 
himself, in his acknowledged publications and his unpublished Journals. The 
reason for this restriction is that in general he does not himself share the point 
of view of any of his pseudonyms. Comparative analyses, of either of these two
types, require prior analyses of each of the pseudonymous works on its own. 
But my paper is intended also, perhaps, as a ‘Prolegomenon to the understanding 
of Kierkegaard's doctrine of faith'.1
1. The Paradox, The Absurd, and The Impossible.
In this section of my paper, I shall argue that the concepts of the paradox and 
the absurd are quite distinct, and, further, that both are distinct from the con­
cept of the impossible. I shall also argue, however, that Fear and Trembling 
implicitly contains a larger conceptual schema in which these three concepts 
(and their conceptual kindred) are consistently and coherently related.
An examination of the language of Fear and Trembling shows quite easily 
that the concept of the paradox is closely related to the concepts of the miracle, 
the marvellous, and the prodigy. The concept of the paradox is introduced in 
the following contexts: (1) that enormous paradox which is the substance of 
Abraham's life' (p. 44), and ‘the tremendous paradox which constitutes the 
significance of Abraham's life' (p. 63); (2) ‘The knight of faith . . .  is the para­
dox .. . ' (p. 90), and ‘the role of the paradox', ascribed to Abraham (p. 127); 
(3) ‘faith . . .  is the paradox of life and existence' (p. 58), and ‘to see what a 
tremendous paradox faith is . . . ' (p. 64); and (4) ‘assuming the burden of the 
paradox', said of the knight of faith (p. 82). Again, the concept of the para­
doxical occurs in the following contexts: (1) ‘the paradoxical movement of 
faith’ (p. 62); and (2) ‘faith . . .  is needed when it is the case of acquiring the 
very least thing more than my eternal consciousness, for this is the paradoxical' 
(p. 59). Now the concept of the miracle is introduced in the following contexts: 
(1) ‘I cannot perform the miraculous', said by Johannes with the clear impli­
cation that Abraham did perform the miraculous (p. 47); and (2) ‘the miracle 
of faith' (p. 33), and ‘faith is a miracle' (p. 77). Again, the concept of the 
marvellous is introduced thus: (1) ‘he performs the marvellous', said of the 
knight of faith (p. 49) and ‘in the next place did the marvellous thing . . . ' 
(p. 61). Similarly, the concept of the prodigy is introduced thus: (1) ‘to be able 
to lose one's reason, and therefore the whole of finiteness. . .  and then by virtue 
of the absurd to gain precisely the same finiteness . . .  is the only prodigy' 
(p. 47), repeated more or less verbatim on p. 52 and p. 58.
The three concepts of the miracle, the marvellous, and the prodigy are all 
applied strictly to the individual's performance of ‘the movement of faith\
What is miraculous (marvellous, prodigious) is that the individual -  Abraham, 
the knight of faith -  performs such a movement, or performs such an act. These 
concepts do not apply to the content of this performance, that is, to the move­
ment of faith itself. Although Kierkegaard says, for example, that it is a miracle 
that the individual performs this movement, he does not say that to perform 
this movement is to perform a miracle (marvel, prodigy). Now ‘the movement 
of faith* is distinct from ‘faith* itself: one is an act, the other is a state or 
condition of the individual. None the less, they are closely related: the indivi­
dual can be in the state of faith only in virtue of having performed the move­
ment of faith. Hence, by an easy transference, the predicates appropriate to 
this movement can be applied to the corresponding state itself. Hence we can 
also say: it is a miracle (marvel, prodigy) that the individual has faith. And 
this gives us the correct interpretation of the phrases ‘the miracle of faith* and 
‘faith is a miracle*. These distinctions also fit, fairly obviously, Kierkegaard’s 
uses of the concept of the paradox. What is paradoxical is that the individual 
can make the movement of faith. Hence, by transference, we can speak of the 
state of faith itself as a paradox: it is a paradox that the individual has faith. 
This, further, allows us to interpret correctly the claim that the paradox is the 
‘substance* of Abraham’s life. For one may well say that faith is the substance 
of his life -  the substance of the life of the individual who is in the state of 
faith. And thus, by a further transference of the predicate, we are justified in 
calling Abraham himself ‘the paradox*. But it can now be seen that (i) this is 
an extremely condensed and abbreviated remark, and that (ii) its sense is ulti­
mately given by the primary use of the concept of the paradox, that is, its 
predicability of the movement (act) of faith.
This group of concepts, I have argued, is properly applied to the act of faith, 
but not to the content of that act; not, therefore, to what the individual brings 
himself to ‘believe* in performing this act. For this we need, and get, a quite 
distinct set of concepts. These are the concepts of the impossible, the unreason­
able, and the preposterous, on the one hand; and the concept of the absurd, on 
the other. Some examples of these usages are as follows: (1) ‘he who expected 
the impossible* (p. 31), ‘he recognizes the impossibility* (p. 57), ‘to face the 
impossibility* (p. 58), and ‘faith . . .  has perceived the impossibility* (p. 58); 
(2) ‘it became unreasonable, Abraham believed* (p. 32); and (3) ‘Abraham 
believed and did not doubt, he believed the preposterous* (p. 35). These claims 
are related to those involving the paradox-iamily in the following way. It is
a paradox that the individual has faith, since to have faith involves believing 
what is impossible (unreasonable, preposterous). This group of concepts, there­
fore, is predicable properly of the content of the act of faith, and not of the 
performance of that act or the corresponding state of faith itself. Kierkegaard’s 
general premiss is the following: that an individual should believe something 
impossible is a paradox. (To repeat: he is not saying that it is impossible). Or, 
more precisely: that an individual should believe something that he himself 
believes to be impossible is a paradox.
This notion of belief is related to the concepts of understanding and thinking 
in the following propositions: (1) ‘he left his earthly understanding behind 
and took faith with him’ (p. 31); and (2) ‘faith begins precisely there where 
thinking leaves off (p. 64). Obviously, if faith involves believing something 
one believes to be impossible.
The idea that faith involves believing the impossible is connected with the 
use of the concept of the absurd. This concept is introduced in the following 
contexts: (1) ‘to make the movements of faith . . .  plunge confidently into the 
absurd’ (p. 44); (2) ‘He acts by virtue of the absurd’ (p. 67); (3) ‘by virtue of 
the absurd to gain precisely the same finiteness* (p. 47), and ‘He resigned 
everything infinitely, and then he grasped everything again by virtue of the 
absurd’ (p. 51); (4) ‘by virtue of the absurd, faith enters upon the scene’ (p. 79); 
(5) ‘He believed by virtue of the absurd . . . ’ (p. 46), and ‘the movements of 
faith must constantly be made by virtue of the absurd’ (p. 48). The first dif­
ficulty we meet in interpreting these claims is the phrase ‘by virtue of the 
absurd’. I suggest that a simple solution is found by identifying the Kierke- 
gaardian claim ‘He believed by virtue of the absurd’ with Tertullian’s famous 
‘Credo quia absurdum’. That is, the sense of ‘by virtue of’ is ‘because it is’: the 
sense of ‘by virtue of the absurd’ is ‘because it is absurd’. Hence the concept of 
the absurd qualifies not the aa, or the state, of faith, but an essential part of 
its content. But it does not only, or primarily, qualify the content of the a a  of 
faith: what it primarily qualifies is the reason for the performance of this a a  -  
the reason for making the movement of faith. For Abraham makes the move­
ment of faith (believes) because what he believes is absurd. It is thus that we 
can explain the relationship between the impossible-family and the concept 
of the absurd. It is the relationship between the propositions ‘Credo quod est 
impossible and ‘Credo quia absurdum’. Hence Kierkegaard employs the con­
cept of the impossible primarily to describe the content of the act of faith 
(belief), the concept of the absurd primarily to describe its ground.
We can now relate the concept of the paradox to the concept of the absurd. 
For we can say: that an individual should believe something because it is absurd 
is a paradox.
The concept of the absurd has, however, a further context, which illuminates 
the contexts hitherto described. ‘It was indeed the absurd that God who required 
it of him should the next instant recall the requirement' (p. 46). (This context 
recalls a further, so far unmentioned, use of the concept of the preposterous: 
‘The Lord .. .  make miraculously the preposterous actual' (p. 34)). This is what 
we might call the fundamental absurdity: the absurd fact. And it is what God 
performs for the believer: to recall the requirement, to save Isaac, to give 
the knight of faith back all his finiteness (here reminiscent of the story of Job). 
This use of the concept of the absurd explains the uses previously described, and 
is therefore fundamental to the whole conceptual schema under analysis. 
Beneath the proposition ‘Credo quia absurdum’ lies the proposition ‘I believe 
that God has done/can do/will do what is absurd'.
Hence the structural interrelationships of all these concepts can be explained 
as follows. (A) God is believed to do what is absurd (and here ‘absurd' is a 
predicate of the event in question). (B) To believe that God will do what is 
absurd is to believe something that is impossible to be believed, since it is 
impossible that what is absurd should occur (and here ‘impossible' is a predicate 
of the content of the corresponding belief). (C) To have faith is, in addition, 
to believe this precisely because the fact one believes God will bring about is 
absurd. (D) It is a paradox that any man should have such a belief and hold it 
on such grounds.
It is important to recognise the stringency of this conceptual scheme, and not 
to commit the error of using the various concepts discussed here in the wrong 
predicative contexts. For example, it is quite un-Kierkegaardian to say: (1) ‘The 
man of faith believes that God will do what is paradoxical'; or (2) ‘To believe 
that God will do what is absurd is to believe something which is paradoxical'; 
or (3) ‘It is impossible, or absurd, that any man should have faith'.2
There are two negative points which can be made at this point. First, when 
Kierkegaard speaks of God as doing the absurd, and of the believer as believing 
something impossible, there is absolutely no reason to suppose that he means 
eiher that God does, or the believer believes, what is logically or scientifically
impossible. There is no reason to suppose that the event which gives faith its 
content and ground is either a self-contradiction or a contravention of laws of 
nature. If we take literally and strictly what he says, we can suppose only that 
this event would be ‘absurd’, ‘preposterous’, that to expect its occurrence is 
‘unreasonable’: and this is simply to say that its occurrence is highly improbable, 
on the basis of the evidence possessed by the believer. For example, an essential 
part of Abraham’s faith, according to Kierkegaard, was his belief that he would 
‘get Isaac back’. But in this there is nothing self-contradictory or contrary to 
natural laws. His belief was merely unreasonable. Second, when Kierkegaard 
calls it a paradox that any man should have such faith, he does not imply that 
this is self-contradictory. For there is no self-contradiction involved in Abra­
ham’s believing (unreasonably) that he would get Isaac back.
These observations help us to locate more precisely the paradox. It is not in 
the fact that someone believes what it is unreasonable for him to believe. This 
is not a paradox at all, however weak we make our interpretation of the term: 
for it is an all too common phenomenon. The paradox, strictly speaking, lies 
in the fact that he believes what he believes because it is unreasonable — quia 
absurdum. For certainly the proposition ‘Credo quia absurdum’ is a ‘paradox’ 
in one of the ordinary senses of this term. (And note once again: it is not a 
self-contradictory proposition, nor one that states a scientific impossibility).
Therefore Kierkegaard’s conceptual scheme, as analysed above, offers no 
support for the view that in Fear and Trembling Kierkegaard puts forward a 
strongly irrationalist position. For if ‘strong irrationalism’ involves the claims 
that (i) God can do what is logically or scientifically impossible, or that (ii) 
the believer believes something that is logically or scientifically impossible, 
we have seen that there are no grounds in the text for ascribing either claim 
to Kierkegaard (Johannes de silentio). If, therefore, he is to be called an ‘ir- 
rationalist’, it can be only in a weak sense of irrationalism. For his position 
involves only the claims that (i) God can do what no reasonable man would 
expect, and that (ii) the believer believes that something no reasonable man 
would expect will in fact occur. It involves, also, the claim that (iii) the 
believer believes that it will occur, precisely because it is what no reasonable 
man would expect: but even this claim is characteristic only of a weak 
irrationalism.
Therefore, when Kierkegaard says ‘he left his earthly understanding behind 
and took faith with him’, and ‘faith begins precisely there where thinking leaves
off, he does not mean that having faith involves believing the logically or 
scientifically impossible. He simply means that it involves abandoning common 
sense.
2. The Paradox and The Contradiction.
As the reader will have noticed, I have so far discussed only the first part of 
Fear and Trembling, namely the section entitled ‘Preliminary Expectoration’. 
In this section of my paper I shall discuss its second part, namely the three 
‘Problems*. As before, my discussion will be severely restricted: perhaps even 
more than before, since there is much in the ‘Problems’ which is not directly 
relevant to my aim. But I shall also try to relate what Kierkegaard says about 
the paradox here to what has gone before.
The second part of Fear and Trembling differs from the first in that, whereas 
Kierkegaard has previously considered faith as it is in itself, he now considers 
it in its relationship to ethics. He makes, we shall find, two presuppositions 
about ethics: (i) that ‘the ethical as such is the universal’ (p. 64), and (ii) that 
the universal is higher than the particular (see p. 67). And the latter presup­
position can also be expressed in the claim: (iii) for human thought, ‘the ethical 
. . .  is the highest thing’ -  or, ethical duty is absolute.
In this part, we find a series of definitions of faith, in each of which faith is 
described (as before) as the paradox. I shall now list the most important of 
these definitions. (1) ‘Faith is this paradox, that the particular is higher than 
the universal ..., that the individual, after having been in the universal, now 
as the particular isolates himself as higher than the universal’ (p. 65). This 
definition is substantially repeated on p. 77 and p. 91-p. 92. (2) ‘The paradox 
is that he as the individual puts himself in an absolute relation to the absolute’ 
(p. 72), substantially repeated on p. 122 and p. 129. (3) ‘The paradox can also 
be expressed by saying that there is an absolute duty toward God’ (p. 80), 
whereafter Kierkegaard immediately repeats Definition (2). (4) ‘This ethical 
relation is reduced to a relative position in contrast with the absolute relation 
to God* (p. 81): this definition is clearly an implication of Definition (3). 
(5) ‘The paradox of faith is this, that there is an inwardness which is incom­
mensurable for the outward . . . ’ (p. 79): this definition is also expressed in the 
claim: ‘Faith . . .  is the paradox that inwardness is higher than outwardness’
(p. 79). (6) ‘There is . . .  a concealment which has its ground in the fact that 
the individual as the individual is higher than the universal* (p. 91): this defi­
nition clearly links Definition (5) with Definition (1).
In the second part of Fear and Trembling, however, Kierkegaard also deploys 
the concept of contradiction, which I have until now left aside. It occurs as 
follows: if ethics is the highest thing for human beings, then ‘it would be a 
contradiction to say that this might be abandoned (i. e. teleologically suspended), 
inasmuch as this is no sooner suspended than it is forfeited’ (p. 65). Now this 
concept also appears in the first part. (1) ‘The ethical expression for what 
Abraham did is, that he would murder Isaac; the religious expression is, that 
he would sacrifice Isaac; but precisely in this contradiction consists the dread .. 
(p. 41). (2) ‘It is a contradiction to forget the whole content of one’s life and 
yet remain the same man’ (p. 54) -  said of the knight of faith.
The concepts of the contradiction and the paradox are linked, in the first 
place, as follows. First, what was said immediately above (in (2)) to be ‘a con­
tradiction* is elsewhere frequently called ‘a paradox’: it refers simply to the 
double movement involved in faith. Second, and more interesting, what was 
said (in (1)) in terms of the concept of contradiction is also said in terms of 
the concept of the paradox: ‘faith is . . .  a paradox which is capable of trans­
forming a murder into a holy act well-pleasing to God . . . ’ (p. 64).
This link is interesting, because it shows that Kierkegaard, when as now he 
is considering faith in relation to ethics, calls it a paradox in a sense which is 
quite different from, and much stronger than, the sense analysed in section 
1. above. This is shown by the fact that the (ethical) predicate ‘murder* and 
the (religious) predicate ‘sacrifice* are genuinely contradictory predicates. To 
apply them both to one and the same act is genuinely, at last, to involve oneself 
in saying something which is self-contradictory. If the ethical judgement and 
the religious judgement are both equally valid (and correct), then two logically 
incompatible judgements are both valid (and correct).
This strong sense of paradox is, however, employed also in each one of the 
six definitions of faith that I quoted above. This does not emerge in the quoted 
passages, nor even explicitly in the reasoning that surrounds them. It emerges, 
on the other hand, if we supply the implicit theory of ethics which underlies 
them, and which I summarised in the two propositions that the ethical is the 
universal, and the universal is higher than the particular. Now this implicit 
ethical theory is not described in Fear and Trembling. To get an idea of it, we
are forced to turn to other Kierkegaardian sources, and in particular the second 
volume of Either ¡Or. Still better, we should look back at the Hegelian ethical 
theory of th^Philosophy of Right.31 cannot, of course, do the work of describing 
this implicit ethical theory here: that would take far too much time and space. 
I must, therefore, ask the reader to have faith that, according to such a theory, 
each one of the six definitions stated above is logically self-contradictory. For, 
given such a theory, it is self-contradictory to say that: (i) the particular is higher 
than the universal; (ii) the individual is absolutely related to the absolute; (iii) 
there is an absolute duty to God; (iv) ethical duty is merely relative; (v) there 
is an incommensurable inwardness; and (vi) there is a ‘higher concealment.
I have already remarked on some of the logical interrelationships between 
these six definitions. I think it is possible to divide them into two groups: first, 
those concerning the absolute duty to God (Definitions (2), (3), and (4)); 
second, those concerning the incommensurable inwardness (Definitions (5) 
and (6)): and then Definitions (1) can be seen as the difinition which links 
these two thoughts. Now I have suggested -  not argued -  that in every one 
of these six definitions Kierkegaard employs the concept of the paradox in the 
strong sense of the logically self-contradictory. This can be supported, further, 
by observing that the set of definitions concerning the absolute duty to God 
amount to precisely the same as the phenomenon already explicitly identified 
as a contradiction’; namely, a (logical) contradiction between the demands of 
ethics and religion. Now, if we assume that Definition (1) can be understood 
as a way of summing up the essential content of this set of definitions, and that 
it therefore entails them, we are forced to infer that Definition (1), too, must 
be self-contradictory. And if we add that it is equivalent, in essential content, 
to the second set of definitions, we can infer that these too are self-contradictory. 
Hence, by the aid of the suggested (but here unsupported) logical manoeuvrings 
I have indicated, we shall have further, and direct, support for my claim that 
the sense in which Kierkegaard is now employing the concept of the paradox 
is the strong sense of the logically self-contradictory.
3. The Paradox and The Paradox.
At this point I can summarise the argument of my paper as follows. In the first 
part of Fear and Trembling Kierkegaard employs a ‘weak’ concept of the 
paradox, of which we know positively that it is properly used as a predicate of
the act of faith and that its use is grounded in the fact that to ‘believe is to 
believe something impossible precisely because it is absurd, and negatively that 
it is not necessarily equivalent to the predicate logically self-contradictory. In 
the second part, he employs a ‘strong* concept of the paradox, of which we know 
positively that it qualifies (i) the fact that there can be an absolute duty to God 
and (ii) the fact that there can be an incommensurable inwardness (which may 
boil down to (iii) the fact that the particular is higher than the universal), and 
also positively that it is to be identified with the predicate logically self­
contradictory. How, then, are we to fit together these two characteristic em­
ployments of the concept of he paradox?
One simple way of reconciling them would be to admit, as I have done, that 
nothing in the first part of Fear and Trembling forces us to construe ‘para­
doxical* as ‘logically self-contradictory*, but to claim none the less that this is 
how it should be construed. Then there will be simply no discrepancy at all 
between the two characteristic uses of this concept.
The other way, which is the way I adopt in this paper, is to affirm not only 
that nothing in the first part forces us to construe ‘paradoxical* as ‘self-contra­
dictory*, but also that we should positively construe it as ‘odd but not self- 
contradictory9 (which is vague enough). Now this interpretation immediately 
lands us, it appears, in the view that Fear and Trembling employs two distinct 
and incompatible concepts of the paradox. I want to argue, however, that 
although it employs two distinct concepts of the paradox, they are not 
incompatible, since they have quite distinct functions. This distinction can be 
indicated by saying that in the first part of Fear and Trembling Kierkegaard 
discusses the fact of faith: in the second he discusses the justification of faith.
Let me begin by comparing the general theory of the paradox, contained in 
the second part of Fear and Trembling, with the conceptual schema used in 
the first part. We have seen that in the first part the paradox is identified with 
the proposition ‘Credo quia absurdum*. Now the paradox of the second part 
(‘that the particular is higher than the universal*) can be related to the paradox 
of the first part in either, or both, of two ways: (A) perhaps the believer has 
to believe ‘that the particular is higher than the universal* for his belief to be 
true faith; (B) perhaps it has to be the case, in this particular instance, ‘that the 
particular is higher than the universal*, for the believer’s belief to be true faith.
(A). Does the man of faith, in addition to believing the absurd because it is 
absurd, have to believe ‘that the particular is higher than the universal* (that
is, to believe one of the six definitions of faith cited above)? Not necessarily. 
He certainly has to believe in God, and also to believe that God will do for him 
something that is absurd. But it does not follow from this that he has to have 
any one of the explicit beliefs in question. But sometimes he may have such 
a belief: and Abraham is a case in point. For Kierkegaard's description of the 
case of Abraham seems to imply that Abraham believed he had an absolute 
duty to God -  which is one of the definitions cited above. In cases of this kind, 
then, the believer must believe some proposition that is a paradox in the strong 
sense, that is, a self-contradiction. Consider now the propositions, ‘A believes 
that p, and p is self-contradictory*. This is clearly stronger than the proposition, 
‘A believes that p, and p is (from A’s point of view) highly improbable. Hence, 
if the latter is logically conceivable, it does not necessarily follow that the 
former is. In fact it may be argued that the former, stronger, proposition is 
itself a self-contradiction. But to argue thus, it seems, we have to define the 
concept of belief in such a way that the concept of believing what is self­
contradictory itself becomes a self-contradictory concept. And we are not forced 
to make this definitory move. Hence I do not consider the strong proposition 
as self-contradictory: it is, on the other hand, very clearly paradoxical. And, 
since it is not plain that it is a paradox of the same kind as ‘Credo quia 
absurdum’, I shall temporarily suppose that it is a paradox of a different, and 
stronger, kind: one which is closer to the concept of self-contradiction, without 
however yet being as strong as this concept. (We may think of it as the ‘inter­
mediate' sense of the concept of the paradox).
One might, however, argue that Abraham is required not only to believe 
something that is self-contradictory, but to believe something that he himself 
believes to be self-contradictory. For does not Abraham believe that God 
commanded him to kill Isaac, and is not the latter proposition something that 
even Abraham must believe self-contradictory? If so, we are faced with the 
proposition, ‘A believes that p, and believes that p is self-contradictory'. Now 
this proposition is even stronger than the stronger of the two propositions 
discussed above. And here I see no grounds for refusing to call it self­
contradictory. Then, in this kind of case at least, we should have a ‘paradox' 
which was simply equivalent to a 'self-contradiction'. But this reasoning appears 
to me fallacious, none the less. There are two arguments that show this. (I) Even 
if we suppose that Abraham believed that God commanded him to kill Isaac, 
we do not have to interpret this as the proposition that Abraham believed that
God commanded him to do something morally wrong. For the error in the 
latter proposition is contained in its confusion of ethical and religious concepts. 
It is equally fallacious to say, ‘God can command the believer to do what is 
morally wrong, and ‘Whatever God commands is eo ipso morally right’: for 
the latter proposition, too, contains just such a conceptual confusion. At the 
point at which the thought ‘God has commanded it’ enters the believer’s mind, 
the thoughts ‘It is wrong’ and ‘It is right’ both leave his mind. And, in the second 
place, it is mistaken to suppose that Abraham believed that God commanded 
him to kill Isaac -  still more, that God commanded him to murder Isaac. At 
most, we should suppose, Abraham believed that God commanded him to 
sacrifice Isaac. And the latter belief, though certainly passing human under­
standing (‘absurd’), is equally certainly not a self-contradiction. Hence, as 
before, it appears that even Abraham is required to do no more than believe 
what is absurd. (2) A stronger point, altogether, can be derived from Kierke­
gaard’s general description of the movement of faith, as this is distinguished 
from the movement of ‘infinite resignation’.4 For the whole point of this 
distinction is that to have faith is (i) to give up whatever is required of one 
(‘infinite resignation’), and (ii) to believe that none the less one will ‘get it all 
back’ -  and this latter is precisely the absurd. Hence Abraham, too, could not 
only have believed that God required the sacrifice of Isaac: he believed also 
that somehow, by God’s agency, he would ‘get Isaac back’. And that implies 
that he believed that he would not have to sacrifice (kill) Isaac. But this belief, 
too, may in its context properly be called ‘absurd’: for Abraham already believed 
that God had commanded him to sacrifice Isaac, and had therefore no rational 
grounds for his expectation that he would get Isaac back. But it is, as above, 
no more than absurd: in particular, it is not either self-contradictory or 
physically impossible. Hence I conclude that we cannot infer that the believer, 
in Kierkegaard’s view, is required to believe something that he himself believes 
to be self-contradictory (or contrary to the laws of nature).
(B). Does it then have to be the case that ‘the particular is higher than the 
universal’, in order for the believer’s belief to qualify as true faith? I think 
the answer is yes. For, on this view, what distinguishes true faith from ‘false 
faith’ (including self-deception) is that the true believer is ‘related absolutely to 
the absolute’ (see Definition (2) above). Now it is extremely tempting to infer 
from this that faith must be a self-contradiction. For are we not saying that a 
self-contradiction (Definition (2)) is both a necessary and a sufficient condition
of the state of faith? And to say this amounts to saying that to describe someone 
as having true faith is logically equivalent to saying that a self-contradictory 
proposition is true. Tempting it may be: but all the same this argument is 
fallacious. For what is logically equivalent to this self-contradiction is not the 
condition of faith itself, but the proposition that a certain mode of belief can 
be identified as true faith. And from the latter proposition it does not in the 
least follow that the belief in question is itself self-contradictory (nor does it 
even follow that it is absurd!)
We are particularly apt to fall into confusion, I think, because the concept of 
faith is employed ambiguously in Fear and Trembling. Sometimes, as largely 
in the first part, it is applied to the believer’s belief (‘Credo quia absurdum’). 
But at other times, and notably in the second part, it is applied rather to the 
believer’s relationship to God. If we make this distinction clearly, we can then 
see that (i) the doctrine of the first part is that the believer’s belief is a paradox 
in the weak sense discussed earlier ; while (ii) the doctrine of the second part is 
that the believer’s relationship to God is a paradox in the strong sense of a 
self-contradiction. And I have added above the possibility, in some cases, that 
(iii) the believer’s belief is a paradox in the intermediate sense, if we suppose 
he believes some one of the six definitions mentioned earlier.
Now I want to consider the particular problem raised by the justification 
of faith. As this term implies, I shall here be dealing with the question of 
the relationship between faith and morality, about which I have already said 
a little above, in discussing the case of Abraham. In the second part of Fear 
and Trembling, the first ‘Problem’ is headed ‘Is there such a thing as a 
teleological suspension of the ethical?’. This indicates that we are not primarily 
interested now in the general phenomenon of faith as a movement or a state: 
we are interested, rather, in the special problem raised by actions whose 
performance (or intention) is grounded in the phenomenon of faith. Abraham 
did not only possess faith: he also intended to act out of his faith. Hence the 
problem I am going to discuss should more accurately be described as the 
problem of justifying acts grounded in faith.
The paradox, in the second part of Fear and Trembling, sometimes takes 
specific form as the existence of an absolute duty to God (Definition (3)) or 
the reduction of the ethical to a relative position (Definition (4)). As I have 
explained this, the paradox must here be construed as a self-contradiction. 
And Kierkegaard also describes as a contradiction the relation between the
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ethical and religious expressions for Abraham’s intended act, that is, between 
the descriptions murder and sacrifice’. To say that the ethical is teleologically 
suspended is to say that an act which, from the ethical point of view, would 
be called murder’ and would be wrong is, from the point of view of faith, 
properly called ‘sacrifice’, and in some sense of the term justified. (I have 
already argued above that it is no longer conceptually possible to employ 
the terms ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ here, so that we cannot say that when the act 
is considered from the religious point of view it is ‘right’. Still less, of course, 
can we say that it is ‘morally right’. Hence I shall leave undefined my use of 
the term justified, although denying that it can be interpreted in terms of the 
concepts right or morally right). The argument of this section can be sum­
marised in the following proposition: if and only if ‘the particular is higher 
than the universal’ (we are here dealing in particular with Definitions (3) 
and (4) of this general thesis), then an act which would otherwise be murder 
is (i) no longer properly called ‘murder’ (but properly called ‘sacrifice’), and 
is (ii) justified. Therefore to say that such an act is justified is logically 
equivalent to saying that a self-contradictory condition is fulfilled. Hence, to 
say that such an act is justified is to say something which is itself logically 
self-contradictory. Now it is important to recognise clearly what this argument 
hvows. It does not show anything that we have not already seen and accepted. 
In particular, the conclusion may well be perfectly valid from a logical point 
of view. For an argument of the general form, ‘If self-contradiction (a) is true, 
then self-contradiction (b) is true’, may well be perfectly valid: the fact that 
both the protasis and the apodosis of this sentence are themselves self­
contradictory propositions notwithstanding.
But, if we suppose that the man of faith is justified in his act, by what 
precisely is he justified? (A) We might assume that his aa  is justified by his 
faith in the sense of his belief. This assumption amounts to claiming that a 
man is justified simply in virtue of his belief that he (as the particular) is 
above morality (the universal) -  that latter not, of course, interpreted in a 
Nietzschean or Callimachean sense, but in the relevant religious sense. But 
this is obviously false. For his belief may itself be false: that is, his ‘faith’ may 
not be true faith. Hence, his act can at most be justified by his faith only if 
we presuppose that this is true faith. But this assumption immediately amounts 
to (B) the assumption that his act is justified by his faith in the sense of his 
relationship to God. (For it is the latter that makes his ‘faith’ true faith).5 And
this is the actual form of the argument in the second part of Fear and 
Trembling. Therefore, once again, in order to account for the paradox of 
‘the teleological suspension of the ethical* (the paradox of justification), we 
do not have to suppose that the believer himself necessarily believes some­
thing self -contradictory. We have to suppose only that a self-contradictory 
condition is fulfilled.
Hence the argument of this section of my paper can be summarised as 
follows. In the first part of Fear and Trembling Kierkegaard analyses faith as 
a mode of belief: and he calls this a paradox in the weak sense in which ‘Credo 
quia absurdum* is a paradox. In the second part he analyses faith as a 
relationship to God (which underlies the belief of faith and guarantees that 
it is true faith, and also justifies acts performed because of this belief); and he 
calls this a paradox in the strong sense (as I have argued) of a self­
contradictory condition. Sometimes, but not always and not necessarily, the 
believer himself believes that such a self-contradictory condition is fulfilled: 
and this, I have argued, we may properly call a paradox in a sense intermediate 
in strength between the two previous senses. (But it is to be noted that this 
phenomenon is not explicitly discussed in Fear and Trembling, and that the 
concept of the paradox is therefore not used in this work in this intermediate 
sense. It is something we may supply for ourselves in working out Kierke­
gaard's arguments).
4. Faith, Understanding, and The Paradox.
In Fear and Trembling Kierkegaard (Johannes de Silentio) remarks frequently 
(i) that he cannot himself understand Abraham, the knight of faith, and (ii) 
that nobody else can understand Abraham. (See, for example, p. 27, p. 36, 
p. 43, p. 44, p. 122, and p. 124). There are other related concepts that he uses 
to make the same point: that he cannot think himself into Abraham, that 
Abraham cannot make himself intelligible, and that Abraham cannot speak 
(p. 70, p. 122), for example. He also remarks that he cannot ‘think* the 
paradox that he encounters when he encounters the thought of Abraham 
(p. 44), and that Abraham's life is ‘so paradoxical that it cannot be thought 
at all* (p. 67). Again, he says it is impossible to understand that anyone can 
believe ‘quia absurdum* (p. 69).
He also, however, says that Abraham himself ‘left his earthly understanding 
behind and took faith with him* (p. 31): and that ‘faith begins precisely there 
where thinking leaves off (p. 64). (And this idea should not be under­
emphasised, as Kierkegaard implies when he speaks of the ‘dread and distress’ 
that faith involves (see p. 41, p. 122, and p. 127, for example).
I have argued that the belief which characterises faith is a paradox only in 
the sense that it is grounded upon its own absurdity (quia absurdum). 
Correspondingly, therefore, the sense in which the man of faith ‘leaves off’ 
thinking or understanding is a weak one. He is required merely to believe what 
is absurd: and this means that he abandons nothing more than his common 
sense. In particular, he is not required to abandon his faculty of reason, or his 
trust in reason. Indeed, it is actually implied that he cannot abandon this: for if 
he did, how could he recognise the substance of his belief as ‘absurdum? All 
he is therefore required to do is to abandon the view that God can do only what 
common sense expects: to accept the view that God can do what common sense 
does not expect. And that is to accept only the view that God’s actions cannot 
be predicted by the ‘laws’ of probability we use in our everyday calculations. 
But, so far as I can see, there is nothing inherently absurd, still less self­
contradictory, in this general belief. It is absurd only from the point of view 
of common sense: but this is precisely Kierkegaard’s point.
In what sense, then, is it plausible (or true) that Johannes de silentio cannot 
understand Abraham? It is true only in the sense that, from the point of view 
of common sense, it is impossible to ‘understand’ (make sense of) someone who 
abandons common sense -  who abandons the common sense way of looking 
at things. Indeed, we can go further: from the point of view of common sense, 
someone who says ‘I know this is contrary to common sense, but I believe it all 
the same’, is saying something that is strictly self-contradictory. (For ‘the point 
of view of common sense’ is precisely that point of view within which it is 
accepted that one can believe only what accords with common sense). But this 
is, of course, a mere tautology.
The relationship of faith, on the other hand, is said to be a self-contradiction. 
It is immediately obviously, then, that it cannot be ‘understood’: indeed, this too 
is a tautology. If it is impossible that anyone would be absolutely related to the 
absolute (God), it is eo ipso impossible to understand that anyone should be so 
related.
Now let us consider the stronger case involving justification. Is the believer 
required to abandon his understanding here, and, if so, in what sense? I argued 
above that we do nor have to interpret Kierkegaard as claiming that Abraham 
believes something he believes to be self-contradictory. He does not, it now 
follows, have to abandon his understanding in this strong sense. But I also 
argued that in certain cases we may suppose the believer does believe some­
thing that actually is self-contradictory, for example, that he has the absolute 
relation to God. But it is of the first importance to recognise that the believer 
himself need not believe this to be self-contradictory. It will certainly be passing 
human understanding’. And the believer may also believe that it necessarily 
passes human understanding. But still it does not follow that he will believe 
that it is self-contradictory. He merely requires to believe something that he 
also believes impossible to understand. And even if we add that he believes it 
to be logically impossible that anyone should understand this, it still does not 
follow that he believes it to be itself self-contradictory. (For there may well be 
propositions which it is logically impossible to understand other than that 
special class of such propositions, all of which it is logically impossible to under­
stand simply because they are self-contradictory). To believe this he has only 
to believe that the understanding cannot understand everything — including, as 
in our case, the possibility of an individual’s having an absolute relation to God. 
And clearly this proposition is not itself self-contradictory: it is only self­
contradictory, in fact, if we make the prior assumption that the understanding 
can understand everything -  that is, if we identify the common sense point 
of view with ‘the absolute knowledge’. (On the other hand, as this argument 
shows, for someone who makes this prior identification -  who both occupies 
the point of view of common sense and identifies it with absolute knowledge -  
the believer will appear to be believing what is self-contradictory).
In what sense does Johannes de silentio fail to understand Abraham? He 
cannot understand him because he has already made a prior commitment to 
the Hegelian ethics. (See section 2. above). Given this prior commitment, 
Johannes is committed to accepting a series of propositions concerning the 
relationship of the particular to the universal, etc.: and, since the believer may 
believe something that is the contradictory of one such presupposition, he is 
already committed to construing that belief as self-contradictory. But the belief 
is not in itself self-contradictory.
Therefore, throughout, the senses in which Kierkegaard (Johannes de si- 
lentio) and Abraham ‘cannot understand’ are systematically distinct. For Kierke­
gaard could ‘understand’ only by understanding a self-contradiction: but 
Abraham could ‘understand’ by understanding an absurdity. The latter is 
required merely to abandon his ‘faith’ in common sense: the former would be 
required to abandon his ‘faith’ in logic and Hegelianism.
Abraham is required merely to abandon his understanding in order to accept 
something he recognises as absurd. Johannes is required to abandon his under­
standing in order to accept something he takes to be self-contradictory. But 
nowhere in Bear and Trembling is it said or implied that Johannes9 point of 
view is the only possible, or only correct, viewpoint. It is a tautology, of course, 
that from his point of view only his point of view is possible, or correct. But 
this tautology entirely fails to prove that this point of view is the only possible 
or correct point of view. Therefore the reader of Fear and Trembling is in no 
way forced to accept Johannes’ account of faith, or its underlying conceptual 
schema. And it follows that at no point whatever in the account of faith is 
the reader required -  as Johannes is at times -  to employ the notion that faith 
is a paradox in the strong sense of being, or involving, a self-contradiction.
Kierkegaard makes a further point about the man of faith: for he says that 
Abraham cannot make himself understood (sc., by anyone else). Now what 
precisely cannot he make himself understood about? He cannot make anyone 
else understand that ‘he would sacrifice him (Isaac) because it is a trial* (p. 122). 
That is, nobody else can understand that what Abraham is required to undergo 
is a ‘trial’. Now from Johannes’ point of view, they cannot understand this 
simply because to understand it requires understanding a self-contradiction -  
the self-contradiction that Abraham is absolutely related to God. But, we may 
ask, why should we suppose these others share Johannes’ point of view? Why 
should we not suppose they, too, are individuals who have faith, as Abraham 
does? If so, they will not see Abraham’s utterance as self-contradictory. But 
they will still see it as ‘absurd’, in precisely the same sense as Abraham himself 
does. For if Abraham himself regards God’s command as absurd, so must these 
other individuals. However, this is the only sense in which they cannot ‘under­
stand’ Abraham: and it is, I have argued, precisely the same as the sense in 
which Abraham too cannot ‘understand’. Once again, and finally, therefore, 
the concept of the logically self-contradictory need not be employed in the 
interpretation of Fear and Trembling.
The Paradox in Fear and Trembling
5. Conclusion.
The major aim of Fear and Trembling is, probably, to show that the point of 
view of understanding and the point of view of faith are incompatible. Kierke­
gaard achieves this by showing that, from the point of view of understanding, 
the point of view of faith involves self-contradiction. But he does not argue 
that, in itself, the point of view of faith involves self-contradiction: and I have 
argued that it involves only the acceptance of the absurd. But I also argued 
that it involves only a corresponding partial rejection of the point of view of 
understanding, or a rejection of the claim that the point of view of under­
standing is the only possible and correct point of view. Faith does not involve 
a total rejection of understanding. From the point of view of understanding, 
there is a logical incompatibility between itself and the point of view of faith. 
But from the point of view of faith there is no logical incompatibility between 
itself and the point of view of understanding. Fear and Trembling is written 
one-sidedly, and therefore its conclusion may be taken to be one-sided. (We 
might put this in the form of an epigram: Faith understands Understanding, 
Understanding does not understand Faith).6
NOTES
1 A ll references are to the Anchor Books edition of Fear and T rem bling, translated w ith intro­
duction and notes by W alter Lowrie, Doubleday, 1954.
2 The great majority o f the uses o f the various concepts I have discussed in  section 1. satisfy 
the schemata that I have constructed and explained. H ow ever there are a few  occasions on  
which som e of these concepts are used in anomalous ways. I have chosen to treat such uses 
as deviant.
3 I take it that there is no need of argument to prove that Kierkegaard leans heavily on H egel 
in his pseudonymous writings.
4  The distinction between ‘the m ovem ent of faith’ and 'the infinite resignation’ is not dis­
cussed in my paper. But it is crucial to  the argument of the later parts of Fear and T rem bling  
and, as I have im plied by using the distinction here, illuminates the concept of 'the absurd’ 
and therefore 'the paradox’.
5 T o believe the absurd is obviously not a sufficient criterion for having faith. The sufficient 
(and necessary) criterion is rather the believer’s relationship to God.
6 It is possible to wonder whether the kind of 'faith’ analysed in Fear and T rem blin g  is in fact 
Christian faith. For it is exem plified in Abraham, and it is possible to wonder whether 
Abraham counted, for Kierkegaard, as a Christian. (In one sense it is obvious that he did 
not: he could not have had the figure o f Christ as the object o f his faith).
